In this study, we examine transformations in the influence of risk managers in two large UK banks over a period of six years. Our analysis highlights that a process we term toolmaking, whereby experts create, articulate, and shape tools that embody their expertise, is central to the way in which the risk managers in our study garner influence in their organizations. Based on our field study, we identify two dimensions that help to explain experts' organizational influence: their ability to (a) incorporate their expertise into highly communicable tools; and (b) develop a personal involvement in the deployment and interpretation of its tools in important decision-making forums. Based on experts' ability to combine and balance these two processes, we distinguish analytically among four positions of influence they can occupy-compliance expert, technical champion, trusted advisor, and engaged toolmakerand trace the movements of experts between these positions. Our empirical findings and theoretical framework contribute to our understanding of how and why experts, such as risk managers, can become influential.
Introduction
Risk management as a technical discipline has been present in financial institutions for more than fifty years; however, its separation from insurance and corporate finance is a more recent phenomenon. Fuelled by regulators' and market participants' long-held demands for -good management,‖ since the mid-90s, risk management has been advocated as a corporate governance and management control practice applicable across all industries. Ironically, the emergence of risk management has coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which has been cast as a risk management failure on an unprecedented scale. The financial crisis and the continuing risk debacles led regulators and industry observers to call for firms to have executives exclusively devoted to firm-wide risk oversight, particularly since it emerged that firms that suffered salient losses (such as UBS and Citigroup), or failed altogether (such as New Century Financial and Lehman Brothers) had ineffective risk oversight. In contrast, observers claim that firms that survived the crisis had a highly visible and vocal internal risk management function and a leadership team that understood and actively managed the risks of their company's exposure (Buehler et al., 2008; The Economist, 2009; Croft, 2009) . But in fact, research evidence on the value added of risk management functions is mixed (Beasley et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2010; McShane et al. 2011) , and it has been forcefully argued that deductive academic research in this area is premature ). Before we can ascertain if risk management indeed has a differential influence on firm performance, we need to understand how (if at all) risk managers themselves exercise organizational influence.
Risk managers' quest for organizational influence can be seen as a recent act in a larger and longstanding drama unfolding both inside and outside organizations: the competition of experts for visibility and voice in the increasingly crowded landscape of management practices and ideas (Guadalupe et al., 2012) . For example, Mintzberg (1994) documents the emergence, heyday, and decline of strategic planning functions, while Zorn (2004) shows how chief financial officers have come to occupy strategic decision-making roles with a focus on managing shareholders and stock prices (Zorn, 2004) . Although management accountants were traditionally seen as acting on behalf of managers to help with the implementation of strategies (Otley & Berry, 1980; Macintosh, 1985) , recent research reveals a potentially more prominent role in analytical tasks, advisory services, and decisionmaking (e.g., Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Byrne & Pierce, 2007; Jarvenpaa, 2007; Mouritsen, 1996) .
3/39
Explanations of the changing influence of experts have tended to focus on environmental (e.g., internationalization) and organizational (e.g., production technology, restructuring) characteristics, along with the individual qualities (e.g., interpersonal skills) of the experts themselves (see, for example, Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Byrne & Pierce, 2007; Jarvenpaa, 2007; Mouritsen, 1996) . Other research has focused on the importance of cognitive and political factors in wielding influence, particularly the activities and tactics deployed in issue-selling (Dutton et al., 1997 (Dutton et al., , 2001 ), sense-giving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) , knowledge-sharing (Carlile, 2004) , and framing (Kaplan, 2008) .
A growing and influential strand within this literature foregrounds an analysis of the tools that actors mobilize in their attempts to influence others (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002 Carlile, , 2004 . Here, the focus is on how actors mobilize -infrastructure that enables
[them] to be the actors they are‖ (Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007:74) . In this literature, tools (artifacts such as engineering drawings, prototypes, formal reports and presentations) are deployed by experts to portray their expertise to others in the organization, and play an important role in facilitating the influence of actors, but we see relatively little about the construction and reconstruction of the tools themselves.
Our research focuses not on the tools per se, but on toolmaking, which we define as a set of practices by which experts create, articulate, and shape tools that embody their own expertise. We also focus on how a particular type of expert, the risk manager, produces and mobilizes tools, such as structured reports, scenario analyses and risk-based performance measures, in order to gather influence (Mikes, 2009 (Mikes, , 2011 . We ask the following research questions: How do risk managers gather influence? What role does toolmaking play in gathering expert influence?
We analyze the toolmaking by risk management experts at two large banks in the United Kingdom (UK). Using separate field studies, we first describe elements of these experts' aspirations, organizational roles, and connections that shape their toolmaking efforts and influence. From this analysis, we extract two principal dimensions that characterize the experts' toolmaking and influence: the communicability of the tools and the experts' personal involvement in the deployment and use of the tools. We define a tool's communicability as encompassing two related elements: its relevance and the understandability of the tool to the user.
We then develop a conceptual framework  which we see as our main contribution  that describes the dynamics of experts' organizational influence, distinguishing between four positions of influence that experts can occupy  compliance expert, technical champion, 4/39 trusted advisor, and engaged toolmaker  defined by the two dimensions of toolmaking. Our framework is dynamic, allowing us to identify toolmaking strategies that affect the transformation of expert influence in organizations.
In the following section we discuss the relevant theory, drawing on both the management accounting literature and a wider managerial research literature on influenceseeking inside organizations. The third section describes our research methods. The fourth and fifth sections present the two case studies. The final section discusses our findings in light of our conceptual framework.
The changing influence of experts
There has been much discussion about real or perceived changes in the importance of experts in organizational life (Baldvinsdottir et al., 2009; Smith & Davies, 2009; Webster et al., 2005; Power, 2007) . The image of the management accountant has certainly changed over the past 50 years. In the 1970s, accountants were seen as rational agents providing accurate and timely information for business colleagues; by the 1990s, they were increasingly perceived as action-oriented communicators and potential business partners. Now they are considered to be handing over much of their role to technological data-collection and dissemination systems (Baldvinsdottir et al., 2009 ). Granlund and Lukka (1998) , however, view an expansion in the role of management accountants, who started off as -historians of the organization,‖ became watchdogs, then advisors/consultants, and are now seen as -agents of change.‖ Others argue that accountants have a continuing prominent role in analytical tasks, risk assessment, advisory services, and direct involvement in decision-making (e.g., Byrne & Pierce, 2007; Jarvenpaa, 2007; Mouritsen, 1996) . Most often, such developments are described as an evolution from the role of -bean counter‖ to that of -business partner.‖ Nevertheless, such changes have more to do with image than with practice, as management accountants still focus primarily on producing information for management and less on taking part in designing strategies.
Human resource (HR) functions have been urged to transform HR from a back-office administrative function to one that is strategically aligned to the needs of the business (Jamrog & Overhold, 2004; Smith & Davies, 2009 ). Marketing functions have witnessed a perceived decline in importance and influence, their role now often embedded in other functions such as product engineering and sales (Webster et al., 2005) . Sociological research on historical developments in the transformation of corporate control shows that different groups become 5/39 important in running a company as its structure and strategic focus change (Fligstein, 1990; Zorn, 2004) . In particular, Zorn highlights how the influence of the chief financial officer (CFO) position increased as the role focused more and more on managing shareholders and stock prices. More recently, as organizations began to perceive risk as a manageable issue, risk managers and chief risk officers have become more prominent and influential (Power, 2007) .
Gathering organizational influence: Competition and knowledge-sharing
Recent advances in the management literature seek to explain how certain organizational actors become influential while others do not. These studies generally imply that -influence‖ is an actor's ability to shape the ways in which others perceive and frame organizational issues.
We group these studies into two strands, one which conceives influence-seeking as competition in a -marketplace of ideas‖ and another which sees it in a more collaborative, knowledgesharing context.
Experts can be seen as actors who operate in a marketplace of ideas and issues, in which they compete for the attention of key organizational decision-makers (Dutton et al., 1997 (Dutton et al., , 2001 ). They do so by -issue-selling‖ in the early stages of decision-making, guiding top management to pay attention to issues and trends that have implications for organizational performance and to understand those issues and trends in certain ways (Howard-Grenville, 2007) . Gaining top management's attention also involves the potential for reputational gains or losses (Dutton et al., 1997) , and thus can affect the image of incumbents in the eyes of others.
Actors have also been shown to try to guide others' sense-making and meaning construction toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis; 2005 , Johnson et al., 2007 . These studies focus on the communicative and interpretive behavior deployed by sense-giving actors  how they envision, signal, and bring about change while overcoming vested interests that object to it. Kaplan (2008) points to the lengthy and involved analyses that engineers and marketers deployed in arguing for and against an engineering project in the course of framing contests. Here, cognitive frames (the means by which managers make sense of ambiguous information) are the resources for transforming and promoting actors' interests. In the competitive world of stock market analysts, Beunza and Garud show how financial analysts also develop and mobilize frames, which are highly specific to their own expertise and experience (Beunza and Garud, 2007) .
Another strand of studies highlights how occupational groups can engage in knowledgesharing and collaboration rather than competing with one another (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002 Carlile, , 6/39 6 2004 . Accordingly, managers can increase their influence by constructing a common language and symbols (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Hope, 2010) with which they convey their knowledge within functions and across functional boundaries (Carlile, 2002) . In turn, such communicative media can give new meanings to existing labels (Corley & Gioia, 2004) or help to construct new explanatory narratives about the organization (Dunford & Jones, 2000) .
Much of the normative management literature regard tools as existing, predetermined artifacts displaying certain intrinsic merits that can bring them to the attention of the appropriate people; as Woolgar (2004:450) put it, -In this perspective ideas are active. That is, […] the best, most robust ideas ‗will out'‖. An alternative constitutive perspective takes issue with the presumption that tools and ideas possess an intrinsic, unchanging character and argues that the nature of tools in organizations can be radically open-ended. This perspective highlights how ideas (be they manifest in tools, products, or accounting standards) are constituted in the processes of their articulation and representation (Woolgar, 2004; Power, 1992) . That is, tools change in the processes of being developed and deployed in the organization. This explains why the current paper focuses on -toolmaking‖ and the emergence, transformation, or disappearance of tools in the processes of influence, knowledge creation, and knowledge sharing.
Toolmaking and the influence of experts
Conceptualizing experts as competing for influence or as sharing knowledge raises the question of how knowledge is produced and communicated in organizations. Nonaka (1994) and Nonaka and Toyama (2003) introduce a dynamic theory of knowledge creation, stipulating that experts, among other organizational actors, seek to change their own personal knowledge (learning by doing, interpersonal communication) into explicit and formal knowledge. We argue that toolmaking, the process by which experts create, articulate, and shape tools that embody their expertise, plays a vital role in increasing their influence. The experts that gain influence in the organization through toolmaking do so by incorporating into the tools elements that they believe would be viewed as different and unique (so they can compete effectively with others in the organizational marketplace of ideas), but they also strive to make the tools relevant to the activities of the tools' intended users. Uniqueness and relevance are not always compatible traits; achieving both can requires a balancing act.
Experts may bring about their own obsolescence by educating others to do without them (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2007) . As Power (1992:8) put it: -Expertise, if it is to survive as unique expertise rather than being broadly disseminated, can never fully disclose itself.‖ In contrast, experts can resist transferring too much of their knowledge to others (Byrne & Pierce, 2007) , fortifying their position by maintaining enough indeterminacy that they are needed for the application of their own techniques (Armstrong, 1985 We analyze our empirical findings to show, in detail, the practices that risk managers use to balance these two interrelated elements of toolmaking and, on the basis of this analysis, we conceptualize four positions of influence that risk managers can occupy (see Figure 1) .
Compliance experts play an important role (e.g., maintain systems to meet regulatory requirements), but produce tools that are not highly communicable to others in the organization. Hence, these experts have little involvement in decision-making outside compliance issues. Technical champions have made their tools so communicable  relevant to activities and easily understandable  that they themselves are no longer necessary to promote those tools or help others use them. As a result, technical champions are marginalized and have little direct impact on decision-making. Trusted advisors influence others predominantly through their personal experience. They offer seasoned judgment, but do not build tools in which their knowledge can be embedded. Their potential influence is therefore limited to the direct social connections they create and maintain within the organization. Engaged toolmakers develop highly communicable tools, but also maintain a personal involvement in the relevant organizational decision-making forums.
<insert Figure 1 here>
Research design

Site selection
Given the lack of research on how risk managers become influential, our research draws 8/39 on an exploratory field study (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Free, 2007; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011) to collect empirical evidence and generate theory about how toolmaking affects the influence of experts. In particular, we chose to study financial risk managers in banks.
Following a theoretical sampling rationale (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) , we chose risk functions in two case study organizations, referred to here as Saxon Bank and Anglo Bank.
Each bank focused on two major business lines: corporate lending and consumer lending. The impending regulatory requirements of the Basel II accord and, in particular, the practice of incorporating risk-assessment measures into capital allocation procedures and the quantification of credit risk (Bank for International Settlements, 2005) motivated the managements of both banks to establish similar high-ranking risk positions, from which the risk functions could influence strategic decision-making. The two banks exhibited many similarities, which can help aid comparisons between cases (Free, 2007) , and made the pair a natural testing ground for us to investigate (1) how risk managers attempt to increase their influence, (2) what role, if any, toolmaking plays in their attempts, and (3) the characteristics of those tools.
Data collection
Seeking to understand how the influence of risk managers changes over time, and knowing that changes in accounting can take considerable time (Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) , we collected data over a six-year period. One of us undertook an internal study of the risk management practices of Anglo Bank, working for 18 months (between 2005 and 2007) Between 2007 and early 2011, we carried out 26 in-depth interviews, both at Saxon Bank's corporate center and in some of its divisions, matching the range of interviewees to the roles of the risk officers already studied at Anglo Bank (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviewees in both banks). The interviews ranged in length from one to two-and-a-half hours; all were recorded and transcribed. We also used internal documents such as internal risk reports, internal presentations, and risk management guidelines and analyzed both banks' annual 9/39 9 reports published between 2000 and 2010. Consistent with the approach of prior research (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004) , we decided to end our fieldwork when we had developed a clear sense of the operations of each risk function and how their influence-seeking practices had come to take their forms.
Data analysis
We conducted a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, we analyzed each of the cases independently and produced an analytical narrative of the changes in each risk function during the research period. The design of our within-case analysis was based on our awareness that the process we describe  the attempts of a group of experts to increase its influence  is a complex, multi-faceted historical narrative, the origins and some of the outcomes of which are likely to be outside our data-collection abilities. Hence, we tried to capture and preserve the actors' accounts of events as they perceived them, and then triangulated these accounts (particularly through publicly available documents, such as annual reports) to produce a more comprehensive picture of the organizational changes (Abbott, 1992) . In this way, we identified actor-presented themes in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) , highlighting distinct categories such as contextual factors, important organizational processes, risk activities, decision-making incidents, and the strategic planning process, while making sure to highlight how these categories changed over time.
In the second stage, we compared and contrasted the two detailed analytical accounts, enriching with cross-organizational insights our picture of the processes we had identified and analyzed. We used these insights iteratively in our theory-building, which we present and discuss in the last section of the paper.
Findings
In response to the impending regulatory requirements of the Basel II reform, Saxon Bank and Anglo Bank had created similar high-ranking positions for the senior executives in their risk functions. Nevertheless, we found significant differences in the influence of these two functions. Using our analytical framework, we analyze these differences and argue that, in Saxon Bank, the risk function's influence progressed towards the position of engaged toolmakers as this risk function designed and developed a series of highly communicable tools that could be used by others. At the same time, key risk officers also became more 10/39 engaged with senior executives in committees and business reviews (personal involvement in producing analysis and interpretation in important decision-making forums). In Anglo Bank, however, we identified one group of risk experts that was active in toolmaking, but failed to make its tools communicable enough to others to achieve the influence it sought (compliance experts). Another group had become influential through its members' individual experience and participation in business-relevant decision-making, but refrained from toolmaking to extend its influence beyond their own personal involvement (trusted advisors).
Saxon Bank
Saxon Bank is a large, primarily UK-based financial services organization with over We trace the transformation of the risk function at Saxon Bank as follows. First, we focus on the structural changes and toolmaking activities central to the rise of the risk function beyond its initial compliance role. Second, we analyze how the risk function aimed to embed risk practices more widely throughout the bank through the development of planning and reporting tools. Third, we highlight how, during the credit crisis, the risk function brought about a particular framing of the world and of Saxon Bank's strategic choices, which gained currency among decision-makers and top executives.
Rising beyond compliance
After a period of poor performance, a new CEO and management team were appointed Having established a unified reporting regime, the risk function aimed to -export‖ its expert view to the bank's most senior managers. In 2004, the CRD initiated a quarterly Consolidated Risk Report (CRR), intended for the members of the Group Executive Committee. About 40 pages long, the CRR reported on trends in six risk areas: market risk, credit risk, insurance risk, operational risk, business risk, and financial soundness (Annual Reports 2004 and 2005) . The production of the CRR was a continuous, iterative, and consultative process. Two members of the risk function prepared the initial draft with guidance from the Deputy-CRD. The draft was circulated to senior colleagues within the risk function for challenge, debate, and comment, in light of which a second draft was prepared.
The Deputy-CRD presented the second draft to a committee composed of the eight most senior risk officers, after which another draft was prepared. The CRD then personally revised the CRR and presented it to the Group Executive Committee for discussion. The CRR was updated again before being presented to the Board and then finally to the Risk Oversight
This cautious consultative approach reflected the risk function's understanding that it was only one part of the central group of support functions, and not in a position to directly influence the planning processes of the divisions and businesses  this was the responsibility of divisional managers. The Deputy-CRD summarized the situation as follows: This concern not to encroach directly on strategic issues was evident in the labeling of risk categories in the report. As the Deputy-CRD recalled:
As part of the Consolidated Risk Report, our business risk section used to be called -strategic risks,‖ but that really did upset everyone, so when I took over, I said, -Oh, we'll call it -business risks.‖… It's like the EU treaty 4 ; it's exactly the same, we just changed the name.
Along with careful attention to language, the risk function also regularly changed the key features of the CRR. The CRD asserted, -You need to put grit in the system. You need to keep changing things, otherwise people fall asleep.‖ Avoiding the use of technical jargon, the risk function sought to ensure that members of the top management team unfamiliar with risk analytics could understand the report. Although the report contained output from complex risk models, risk officers took great care to ensure that the accompanying explanations were adequate for a non-risk-specialist audience, particularly at the Board level. For example, the first three or four pages of each report were dedicated to a -traffic light‖ representation of risks, with red signaling the need for immediate attention from executives and amber and green, less immanent risks. The Deputy-CRD remarked:
I wouldn't last very long if I gave them a spreadsheet and said, -It's all in there, mate. You figure it out.‖ … It's the analysis. The numbers are just one part of it … we use that as input to write the report … We spend a lot of time writing these reports and it's analysis for the Board.
The strong focus on translating numbers into qualitative interpretations was coupled with an emphasis on limiting the CRR's length. For example, during 2007, the CRR was reduced from about 40-50 pages to not more than 20 pages, with a maximum of two pages per risk type. The CRD emphasized the positive effect of the CRR on the executives and the Board:
And certainly, you know, for the Board, they always say … that they learn more about the business-and what's going on in the business and how well it's doing-from the risk report than from anything else they see. And they say that every time.
Important to the risk function's attempts to expand its influence was the way in which the business units' views were incorporated into the CRR. Rather than expecting business units to report key risk trends (through their Divisional Risk Officers) to the central risk management function, central risk officers actively sought out issues in the divisions by talking to business people. In her initial years at the bank, the CRD made a habit of spending one day a week talking to people on the ground who were running various activities. Many senior officers from the central risk function followed her example and the Deputy-CRD further encouraged his team to act as -the eyes and ears‖ of the Executive Committee and the Board:
[I tell my team], -If you were the Executive Committee and you dug deep down within parts of the organization and found something-‗Oh my goodness, I didn't know we're doing that'-you would have to go, ‗We need to do some work on it.'‖ So we identify [the risk] and do the work and then report it up to the Board.
By taking this approach, the risk function espoused that risk management and business were inseparable; risk managers had to understand the bank's strategy and the businesses' operations in order to understand the risks. As the Risk Modeling and Aggregation Director put it, -You can't actually talk about the risks in the business without actually telling the story of what the business is doing.‖
In short, the efforts to increase the risk function's influence took place in two related areas. On the one hand, the risk staff incorporated the CRR, and the expertise it conveyed, into Saxon Bank's top-level decision-making forum. On the other hand, the expert views expressed in the report were informed by the insights, preferences, and considerations of the business managers.
Reporting about the future
The CRR's growing influence in strategic-level discussions exposed another dimension of that tool. Saxon Bank's risk officers noticed that the report prompted executives to engage in debates that were often forward-looking and related to the strategic plans under consideration. The Director of Risk Aggregation and Modeling explained:
When [the CRR] goes to the Executive Committee, they can look at the overall risks and decide whether the report is fairly representative of the way they think the risks are. Secondly, are they happy with the risk profile? Because you may be in a position where you are happy to be red on change risk, for example when you want to drive a strategic change through. So what you're saying is, -Look, we want to do this, so we're going to run some change risk.‖ Or you might say, -We're not happy with this customer treatment risk‖ or -We're going to change our strategy, so our strategy risk will go up.‖ So [the CRR] is trying to get those sorts of debates. And we are also getting the risk-reward debate up and going as well. For example, if we wanted to grow our income by this amount over the next five years, what would happen to our risks?
The seemingly spontaneous rise of such forward-looking questions and arguments in the strategic decision-making debates coincided with the risk function's proposal that a formal future-oriented calculative practice, scenario analysis, should become part of Saxon Bank's annual and medium-term planning processes. Scenario analysis involved specifying hypothetical scenarios and examining their financial implications, usually in the form of likely losses (Crouchy et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2001) . At Saxon Bank, scenarios typically described economic conditions that were believed to prevail in recessions occurring with a frequency of -one in seven years‖ or -one in 25 years.‖ In response to the risk function's -what if‖ questions, the business managers were asked to -stress test‖ their proposed plans and come up with alternative -Plan B's.‖
The medium-term planning process had taken place under the umbrella of the Group Finance function 5 .
5 Each business unit (and subsequently each division) developed strategies and profit-and-loss projections for the forthcoming three years. The central finance staff aggregated the plans and presented them to the Executive Committee. Senior executives and the Board approved (or requested changes to) the pro-forma profit-andloss projections and the requisite capital requirements of each business unit. The medium-term targets then
This gave the risk function an opportunity to insert the risk view into an existing and organizationally significant process with strong accountability mechanisms in place instead of having to create an entirely new process and convince busy managers to invest in it.
Importantly, the risk function had already established a close and collaborative working relationship with the finance function, supported by the CRD being structurally on an equal level with the Group Finance Director.
The Deputy-CRD explained:
The best delivery mechanism by far is Group Finance's medium-term planning process, because it's a framework. Everyone has to do it, otherwise the Group Finance Director will have a chat with them. They [business units] all know how it works, so by working with finance people, when we ask for something to be done, then it gets done. So it's not like separate papers coming out from Group [center]. It's the regular planning pack and the guidelines for completing the medium-term planning process. We just dovetail our extra page in and it's seamless.
But timing was a challenge. At first, business plans and scenarios were both developed separately during the third quarter of the year, which did not allow for cross feeding between the two processes. In 2008, the risk function moved scenario analysis earlier in the planning cycle so that risk considerations, particularly those related to severe economic downturns, could frame the development of plans within the business units.
The risk function needed to convince the business lines that its scenarios were credible.
As scenarios could ultimately affect business plans and subsequent incentive compensation, it was expected that business units would resist running scenarios that were perceived as overly pessimistic or out-of-touch with their own views. The risk function therefore involved the most senior managers of each division in developing the scenarios, giving them -pre-emptive‖ acquaintance with the scenarios. As the Deputy-CRD explained:
The draft scenarios will be challenged in each of the divisions … and only then will they be used in the medium-term planning process, because, on that basis, everybody would have bought into them. So rather than the Group just giving them more work to do, they will say, -Oh, here's my scenario that I report into.‖
This was corroborated by a Managing Director from the Commercial Banking business unit who explained to us that the divisional manager and his senior staff discussed the scenarios, debated the parameters and levels of stress, and then fed this information back to the risk function. The heads of business lines could therefore recognize their own ideas and definitions in the final version of the medium-term plan.
As the risk function worked to involve the business units in scenario development, it also sought to demonstrate its credibility by creating a suite of economic indicators that would provide the basis for each scenario. This tool came to be called the Early Warning System formed the benchmarks for divisional performance evaluation and senior management compensation.
(EWS).
The development of the EWS began after the appointment of the Deputy-CRD in 2007.
He was concerned about the inability of the risk function to systematically track the underlying changes in the economy. The tool took a year to develop and included indicators such as confidence indices (consumer, business, housing, etc.), swap rates, interbank interest rates, and macroeconomic data such as the Eurozone Consumer Price Index. The indicators were categorized as core or non-core. Core indicators were those that had been most highly correlated with past movements in the economy. The risk function hired its own economist to assist the Deputy-CRD in creating the EWS. She drew on input from the Group Economist's team (who had been supplying information on the core indicators), but she explained that from the risk function's point of view, more was required:
These [core indicators] are the ones which have proven in the past to be the most highly correlated with the economy. But we are aware that we can't predict what is going to be the main hit to the economy in the future … The economy changes structurally all the time and that's why we don't concentrate only on those which have been highly correlated with the economy in the past, but on the much broader range.
Initially, there were about 50 non-core indicators, but that number grew steadily to 160
as the risk function gathered information from the divisions about emerging risks and The EWS helped convince the organization's various functions that the parameters in the risk function's scenarios were worth following. As the Deputy-CRD explained: In turn, the scenarios were a useful managerial tool for the business line managers.
The Managing Director of the Commercial Banking business unit confirmed:
It's [the scenario] also, I think, a very good leadership tool. Because … when I arrived, people tended to be very functionally-based. So the finance people sort of did the numbers, but did they understand the business drivers behind the numbers? The HR people sort of did the people bit, but did they know-did they understand the impacts that we would have-the decisions we would have to take in terms of people in different environments?
As the scenarios were not directly related to any particular area of practice (such as finance or HR), they were not framed according to the knowledge of any specific group in the business unit. They therefore helped the business unit manager to present a wider picture to all his or her managers. The scenarios could also support the business unit manager's preferred method of managing risk. The Managing Director of Commercial Banking explained that, before the inclusion of scenarios in the planning process, stress testing focused primarily on predicting profits (i.e. the income statement). However, the Managing Director felt that that there was a -need to look a bit more at the balance sheet‖ and at the business With the help of tools such as scenarios and the EWS, the risk function increased its influence on decision-making in the long-term and medium-term planning process. Scenarios and the EWS served as tools that business managers used to prepare forecasts of profits, balance sheets, and cash flows. At the same time, input from other managers was incorporated into the design of these tools, helping to build and reinforce trust.
Reframing key discussions
In 2007, deteriorating economic conditions drew attention to the tools the risk function had developed. The CRD decided to deploy the scenarios in the Group Executive Committee and directed the attention of top management to the relevance of the tool:
The biggest use of stress tests was actually not in the medium-term planning exercise, but at the Group Executive Committee, during 2007 … It became a real living tool there. I could go into the meeting and say, -Now we are in a one-in-seven-years downside scenario. What are we going to do?‖ If we are in a one-in-seven-years recession, a one-in-15-years recession cannot be too far away. So we had to be very action-oriented. There was so much uncertainty, we shifted between the downside scenarios back and forth. But it gave us a framework to think about what was happening.
Once top management started asking about the implications of the downside scenarios, the answers had to be gathered from the businesses  by the business managers themselves.
The subsequent discussions took place in face-to-face meetings, called the Quarterly Business
Reviews, in which the CEO and several Group Executive Committee members invited divisional heads to make presentations. They then questioned and challenged them about their business performance, the expected impact of deteriorating business conditions (expressed in scenarios), and their proposed responses. These intense and challenging meetings soon became known in the company folklore as -star chambers with the CEO.‖ Accordingly, divisional managers spent a lot of time preparing their quarterly presentations. The CEO would also raise the pressure on the divisions by sending a follow-up letter starting with the line that divisional heads came to dread: -I am sure you are as disappointed as I am...‖ At this point, the risk function was able to step in to help divisional heads make their scenarios relevant to the key strategic decision-makers and to develop Plan B's for discussion with the executive team. The CRD emphasized that this was indeed the hallmark of the new business-oriented risk function, which was now partnering with the businesses to help them do a better job at risk management:
The stress test [as part of the scenario-planning exercise] is just an academic exercise unless it says, if this happens, then that happens, and so on. Initially, when we poked management actions proposed by the businesses, we just found candy floss. People just went through the motions. We had to do a shed-load of communications to make them understand how to do this properly. We sent them little booklets (not emails that are easy to overlook!) to explain, we introduced annual Risk Prizes, not only for the risk community, but also for business people who contributed to risk management.
The rise of the Quarterly Risk Reviews, in turn prompted the risk function to redesign the CRR to incorporate the implications of the scenarios and early warning indicators that the businesses were now preparing and tracking in earnest. Up to this point, the CRR had been focused on the current status of each risk (red, amber, or green) and how this had changed over the preceding three months. Drawing on the results of the EWS, the risk function started to incorporate a forecast of the likely status of each risk type 12 months into the future.
Commenting in 2010, the Deputy-CRD highlighted that this additional information was seen as not only relevant, but also defendable:
The Early Warning System was a tool for us and we used it to very much inform and direct our horizon risk analyses and then our recommendations as to what the bank should be doing. So the final deliverable for the Executive Committee was our views and recommendations: -This is what we think.‖ If asked, -Why do you think that?‖ we could say, -Well, because we do a lot of analysis and we think the horizon risks are suggesting this.‖ The Early Warning System is very much underlying it [i.e., the forecasting of the future status of risks in the CRR].
Summary
At Saxon Bank, we were able to observe different ways in which a group of experts aimed to increase its influence. Toolmaking was central. The CRR, the scenarios, and the EWS 
Conflicting views of risk management
Old guard risk managers had at least 25 years of experience in various banks in corporate and consumer lending, the bread-and-butter of traditional banking. Many had advanced through the ranks of the business lines and various levels of risk control. The top tier of these risk officers occupied key governance positions at Anglo Bank, heading centralized risk-control processes such as credit-risk management and country-risk management at the group center. Two of them sat on (and alternately chaired) the highest decision-making committee in the corporate lending business, the three-member Group Credit
Committee. Another two of the old guard acted as senior risk officers in the business lines (corporate and consumer lending), with formal authority to oversee the execution of business strategies from a risk perspective.
These risk managers had developed considerable knowledge about the banking business and had developed their own personal heuristics for judging the risk of companies, which included a strong emphasis on the external environment. In their day-to-day operations, the old guard did not practice risk-silo management (Mikes, 2009) The general point, which I'm not sure how many people get, is that there is nothing in our accounts about the risk that the bank is running, unless you go through a separate risk analysis process.
This highlights two important points about the new guard's view of risk management.
First, the primary unit of analysis was the entire bank's operation and, second, the new guard advocated the need for a specific process to aggregate and assess the bank's risks. In particular, the new guard was concerned about the lack of a common -risk language‖ and a consequent inability to aggregate Anglo Bank's risks at the group level. As the Group Head of Risk Reporting saw it:
Can [Group Risk] provide that [aggregate risk] information centrally? The process does not exist, the discussion framework is not there, and the language is not there. So we have to build up that language. We asked the businesses to provide the data, but they could not.
The infrastructure he saw lacking  tools that would have created the -common language‖ and the -discussion framework‖  was something the old guard had not needed.
The old guard focused on analyzing and then approving or rejecting the single loan for which they relied on their previous experience in the business lines and on frequent interaction with business managers. The new guard, in contrast, promoted an approach that divided the bank's activities into specific risk categories (rather than loans and other particular investments and products), aggregated these risk categories, and produced bank-wide quantitative risk assessments. This difference in views became apparent in 2005-2006. In the next section, we describe how the differences were expressed in the development of risk practices.
Competing tools and risk practices
In 2006, the new guard created a governance document  also called the Risk Management Framework  in which they sought to standardize risk management across Anglo Bank. They divided risk management activities into different risk types and proposed that risk heads (such as the Head of Credit Risk and the Head of Country Risk) and other executives each take responsibility for a risk type through limit setting and monitoring.
The Group Head of Risk Reporting recruited a 12-member team to advocate the benefits of an independently set, standardized risk-management process across the organization. The team requested business unit heads to document all policies and risk standards applied in the management of their operations' credit, market, and operational risks.
The intention was to highlight common best practices and to cut out outdated ones. By imposing a new language for risk processes, they were preparing the ground for the next tool:
economic capital, an aggregate measure of risk for each risk type.
The missing risk-analysis piece, according to this view, was a formal calculation of the risk content of the bank's different business strategies. Such calculation required a business manager to understand the riskiness of his or her balance sheet  loan by loan, asset class by asset class, industry segment by industry segment  and then aggregate these risks across his or her entire asset portfolio. This goal, however, faced considerable challenges in Anglo Bank.
The Group Head of Risk Reporting diagnosed the situation in 2006 as follows:
[W]e will need to put more emphasis on the balance sheet in the planning process than we have done before. We are trying a dry-run [of the economic-capital calculations] this year. We have encountered great difficulty; it is a nightmare. We cannot do it. When you ask the businesses to forecast their income, there is a well-understood process there. When we ask them to forecast their balance sheet and their capital need, they cannot do it. Business people don't know the risk profile of their business.
Forecasting income is a widely practiced process in banks. In contrast, forecasting economic capital was an emerging practice in the banking sector and had not been practiced at all in Anglo Bank.
The Group Head of Risk Reporting recruited a small team of analysts who also had experience with risk-capital allocation methodologies in other banks. They used the Risk Management Framework to determine which risk types they needed to allocate capital against and which risk types were best managed by a process. One of the new guard risk officers from the economic capital team described how earlier attempts at introducing the economic capital methodology in Anglo Bank had failed:
There's been two fairly major initiatives in the past to get economic capital [the methodology] embedded. But the problem is, I'm not sure how much buy-in it's had from senior management … I don't think [our Chief Executive] has ever been particularly keen. He's had metrics that he was interested in, and economic profit wasn't one of them ... when he came in it got dropped from the senior management profitability packs. As soon as that happened, you can imagine the effect that had on things like data quality and how much attention people were paying to it. It was pretty obvious the management on top was not interested.
Despite the failure of earlier implementation attempts, the new guard positioned economic capital as a relevant measure in the 2007 regulatory environment; the implementation of Basel II in 2008 would make economic capital mandatory. However, the economic capital team lamented that regulatory compliance had to be the key -selling point‖ of the methodology, and that Anglo Bank resisted adopting a technique that they viewed as superior to existing planning and budgeting practices in any case. One of the team members summed up these concerns:
Unfortunately, we are relying on the regulatory crutch to push [economic capital] through and forward. What our true selling point ought to be-and it's difficult to make that-is that it will improve the bank; it will add value to you as an organization because you will be able to better understand what your capital requirements are. You will be able to link your capital requirements to shareholder value; you can budget and plan much more comprehensively. At the moment, we budget from a P&L profit and loss perspective, but we're saying that by doing it differently we decide to also incorporate a balance sheet view.
The new guard risk officers struggled to come to terms with the fact that it was not only Anglo Bank's business managers who resisted the Risk Management Framework and the economic capital methodology, but also the old guard risk officers within their own risk management community.
According to the Risk Management Framework, credit risk and country risk were two distinct types of risk, each calling for a different set of responsibilities and expertise. This was antithetical to the old guard approach, voiced by the Head of Country Risk:
Through the Risk Management Framework, we have compartmentalized risk. There is market risk, there is operating risk, there is reputational risk and credit risk… The reality is: They all interact.
Other old guard risk officers also resisted the proliferation of documentation that accompanied the formalization of risk policies. The Chief Risk Officer of the corporate banking division highlighted that setting boundaries was the preferable way to manage risks:
There is little point in my mind in having a 4,500-page document setting out your risk policies because nobody's ever going to read it. They can't hold it in memory. What I've been trying to do is move towards what we won't do from a risk [management] perspective, which allows people in the business to have the freedom to do certain things provided they don't breach certain boundaries. If they breach certain boundaries, they've got to come back to me and ask. [salespeople] will know where the boundaries are and they won't bring me business that doesn't get approved. As long as you are supportive of good business, and explain why you turn business down, you should never get any knives. What we try to do is a partnership.
Creating and maintaining a relationship that gave freedom of action to the business lines was important for the old guard. In turn, business managers were obliged to interact directly with the risk manager as situations evolved. Under this arrangement, there was little room for such lengthy documentation as the Risk Management Framework. In order to influence business managers, the old guard developed and mobilized their in-depth knowledge of the business manager's worldviews. The CRO of the corporate bank explained:
[Y]ou need to know the business generators well enough to know when they are likely not to tell you the truth … The issue is to understand how they operate within their values. So not only do you understand where they are likely to over-egg it because the rewards are there, but also it will tell you how to approach them when you want to slow them down.
The impact of the old guard risk officers at Anglo was most visible in discretionary strategic discussions about large-scale lending decisions, where senior risk officers found it necessary to strike a balance between partnering the business generators and retaining an ability to say no if they had second thoughts about a deal.
The old guard distanced itself from the economic capital methodology promoted by their new guard colleagues by stating that the alleged technical superiority of the economic capital approach was irrelevant because, as one senior risk officer put it, -the businesses are coming back and saying, ‗Guys, wake up! That's not the way we run the bank.'‖ According to the old guard, the core test was whether or not economic capital was helpful for running the business, irrespective of its possible technical advantages.
Summary
The such an infrastructure, the striking differences in the two groups' worldviews hampered a potential collaboration combining the old guard's risk expertise and the new guard's toolmaking abilities.
Discussion and conclusion
Having presented empirical evidence concerning the changes faced by the risk functions in two large UK banks and the different fates of their risk management experts, we now compare and contrast the two cases. We first outline three factors that we identify as contributing to the success or failure of the tools and practices that the two risk functions employed.
Toolmaking and influencing
First, there is a significant difference in the willingness of the risk functions at Saxon
Bank and Anglo Bank to allow their tools to change in the process of their deployment. Anglo
Bank's new guard risk managers were reluctant to use feedback and data coming from the business lines in developing their tools, viewing it as deficient (for example, not accurate enough). They relied on an external source of authority (the Basel II directives) to legitimize their methodology, and employed a set of pre-defined  rather than internally-negotiated  procedures. In contrast, Saxon Bank's risk function treated feedback and information from business line managers as valuable -raw material‖ to be incorporated into their tools, absorbing management insights into the CRR and the scenarios, and adding new indicators suggested by management to the EWS. By developing tools that readily incorporated information and knowledge from other managers, these risk experts aimed to make their own tools more relevant to the business lines, to facilitate knowledge-sharing by building a common ground (Bechky, 2003) , and, ultimately, to increase their own influence. As one small component of the general influencing process of -configuring the user‖ (Woolgar, 2004) , Saxon Bank's risk function managed its relations with potential users by making them think that important ideas for designing the risk-management tools were theirs. This explains why Saxon Bank's risk function succeeded in linking its scenarios to the already influential medium-term planning process, and in gaining a foothold in a practice that had been receiving managers' attention across the organization. In comparison, Anglo Bank's new guard failed to attach its proposed measure of economic capital to existing organizational reporting practices.
In a crucial sense, this was the result of their lack of willingness to -open up‖ their tools to potential inputs from other managers; hence the influence of those tools remained limited.
Second, comparing the two cases enriches our understanding of the role of experts' credibility in organizational decision-making. In Saxon Bank, credibility was based on tools and thus -good‖ tools  communicative, relevant, and helpful to managers  made the risk function seem more trustworthy, which helped to increase its influence. The -experiencebased‖ credibility of Anglo Bank's old guard, however, was attributed to individuals rather than to the function as a whole. Because their expertise was never embodied in highly communicable tools, it could not spread beyond them or outlast them, limiting their overall influence. Members of the new guard lacked the experience of the old guard and their tools never gained senior management's support; accordingly, these risk experts were unable to increase neither their credibility nor their influence.
Third, the two banks' risk functions differ in the importance they assigned to the communicability of their tools in relation to those outside the risk function. Saxon Bank's risk function tried continuously to shorten their reports, to simplify the way data and measures were presented, and  overall  to make their message clear to business lines and senior executives. We do not see this in Anglo Bank. It has to be noted, though, that the area of comparison is partial, because Anglo Bank's new guard risk managers had little opportunity to present their assessments and predictions to top-level managers and others in the organization, as Saxon Bank's risk managers did. It may be, then, that they did not develop communicative tools in part because they had little incentive to do so.
Our analysis of risk managers at Saxon Bank and Anglo Bank highlights the importance of toolmaking to generating knowledge and, more broadly, to exercising influence in organizations. The toolmaking perspective complements the literature on influencing as issueselling, sense-giving, and framing and the literature that describes influencing via knowledgesharing processes. In these organizationally grounded papers the spotlight falls on the -intervening‖ social variables and conditions of disseminating expertise. Our emphasis is on the construction of tools as a socio-technical process (Wajcman, 2010) . Tools do not possess a transcendental, unchanging character, but are instead constituted and reconstituted through contingent processes at play in their genesis, take up, interpretation, and use (Woolgar, 2004) .
That is, exercising expert influence fundamentally involves creating and refining tools embodying not only the experts' expertise, but also the expertise of the prospective users. In fact, we see that the more the process of toolmaking becomes a -co-creation‖ with intended users, the more influence the toolmaker can garner.
Transformations in the influence of experts
We now outline a more general framework to describe how experts can become influential in organizations and how their influence can change over time. In doing so, we draw on our case analyses of the two separate organizations that are similar in important respects, but also note that they have different histories, cultures, and operating models.
Building on the conceptual framework presented earlier, we conceptualize transformations in experts' influence along two interrelated dimensions. Movement along one axis involves incorporating the experts' knowledge into highly communicable tools.
Movement on the other axis involves ensuring that the experts maintain significant personal involvement in producing analysis and interpretation in important decision-making forums.
We see these two dimensions, and the links between them, as the key aspects of our framework. We then use these two dimensions to outline four positions that experts can occupy  compliance experts, technical champions, trusted advisors, and engaged toolmakers  by moving along these two axes to differing degrees. Below, we use our cases to elaborate these four positions and to highlight the dynamic nature of the processes we identified (see (compliance with regulatory requirements), but whose influence on business activity and strategic decisions was very limited. In particular, their tools did not communicate their knowledge in ways that were understood and accepted by the business lines and top managers, who saw a gap between these tools and the way they ran the bank.
Technical champions make their tools so relevant to the tasks and easily understandable that they themselves are no longer needed to make sense of the information generated by those tools. Here, the experts do not maintain their role as -critical points of passage‖ in the use of their knowledge; other organizational actors can use it on their own. By way of analogy, it takes an expert watchmaker to make a watch, but no one needs to consult a watchmaker to tell the time. The practices of Saxon Bank's risk managers revealed that a delicate balance is required if an expert function hopes to disseminate decision-relevant expertise without losing participation in decision-making, that is, they needed to demonstrate not only that their tools were relevant, but that they themselves (particularly senior risk managers such as the CRD and the Deputy-CRD) were needed to translate that knowledge into formats that management could digest and turn into actionable items. Our analysis indicates that, through this careful balancing, the risk function at Saxon Bank was able to move beyond the position of technical champions.
Trusted advisors have knowledge that is considered important by other organizational actors because of its high level of analysis and interpretation, but their influence is limited because it is neither applicable nor replicable without their personal involvement. We have seen how member of the old guard at Anglo Bank were greatly valued for their intimate knowledge of the business, but their influence was limited because it was tied to their direct involvement; they had not developed tools that, apart from embodying and portraying their expertise, could also be disseminated throughout the bank in their absence. Such trusted advisors may be influential for a time, but truly deep influence accrues to experts who create tools that outlast them.
Engaged toolmakers have developed tools to communicate their knowledge to other organizational actors, but in such a way that they themselves remain necessary passage points for fully understanding, interpreting, and acting upon the knowledge generated by those tools.
At Saxon Bank, for example, the CRR, the EWS, and the scenario analyses were  by the end of our research period  becoming indispensable tools, used by others in important decisionmaking forums. Critically, tools communicated the experts' knowledge, but the experts themselves were still needed to interpret that knowledge to the business lines and in top management committees.
Our framework highlights the dual movements  along the axes of developing communicable tools and personal involvement  needed for experts to become and remain influential. That is, becoming an engaged toolmaker requires both incorporating knowledge into tools and concurrently ensuring personal involvement in producing analysis and interpretation in important organizational decision-making forums. Our analysis suggests that these dual movements may be self-reinforcing. That is, creating highly communicable tools can enhance the experts' credibility (and trust in the experts) and thus promote their involvement in decision-making, which can, in turn, further increase the visibility, acceptance, and communicability of the tools. This self-reinforcing process is particularly evident at Saxon Bank, where the CRD's role in the Group Executive Committee helped her function develop and improve its tools (such as the CRR and the scenarios). Over time, the enhanced communicability of the tools provided the CRD and the other senior risk managers with the credibility and knowledge to advance the risk function's influence through their personal involvement at the highest-level decision-making forums, such as the Quarterly Business
Reviews.
In contrast, the lack of a connection between these dual movements helps to explain how experts become trusted advisors and technical champions. Trusted advisors, such as the old guard at Anglo Bank, have extensive personal involvement in producing analysis and interpretation, but this is not linked to a parallel process of incorporating their knowledge into tools that can operate in their absence. Technical champions, in contrast, have embedded their knowledge in highly communicable tools, but failed to connect their tools to their own involvement; that is, other organizational actors can operate the tools without them.
Our theoretical framework contrasts with much of the literature on experts, which can be overly descriptive  outlining how the roles of experts have changed over time  or strictly normative  advocating an increased organizational role for a particular group, such as accountants or HR specialists (e.g., Baldvinsdottir et al., 2009; Smith & Davies, 2009; Webster et al., 2005; Jamrog & Overhold, 2004) . Our four-part typology of compliance experts, technical champions, trusted advisors, and engaged toolmakers provides a conceptual framework for further research. Our framework indicates that experts may gain influence not by arriving at the organization with a predefined methodology, but rather by initiating and maintaining meaningful relationships with other managers. Information and knowledge flowing in both directions helps the experts' toolmaking efforts and strengthens trust and support amongst the experts and other organizational actors. Our analysis also indicates that the greatest increases in experts' influence are likely to come about when the processes of toolmaking and personal involvement are interconnected and self-reinforcing.
Our theoretical framework and findings focus on the role of toolmaking as experts gain, fail to gain, or lose influence, and seeks to complement other explanatory factors. For example, consistent with studies of changes in corporate control (Fligstein, 1990; Zorn, 2004) , we noted in our introduction that the heads of our two risk functions had obtained highranking positions as risk management became more important in the corporate world. The settings help us eliminate some alternative structural explanations that the extant risk management literature offers to explain the differential influence of risk management functions; in particular, the presence and formal authority of the chief risk officer and espoused top management support (Beasley et al., 2008) . Given that both banks had CROs (and senior risk officers) with espoused top management support and access to the executive board (the most important decision-making forum at each bank), the differential positions of influence they came to occupy requires an explanation that goes beyond structural arrangements. We have seen that the risk functions (particularly at Saxon Bank) employed a variety of influencing tactics as they interacted with other organizational actors (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007) . Building on research emphasizing the role of tools (Carlile, 2002 (Carlile, , 2004 Bechky, 2003) , this study showed that toolmaking  the process by which experts create, articulate and shape tools that embody their expertise  play a vital role in explaining how risk experts -configure‖ users and by doing so, become influential. 
Figure 1 Different positions of influence for risk managers in organizations
